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Abstract
International agricultural trade triggers inter-dependency among distant coun-
tries, not only in economic terms but also under an environmental perspective.
Agricultural trade has been shown to drive environmental threats pertaining
to biodiversity loss and depletion and pollution of freshwater resources. Mean-
while, trade can also encourage production where it is most efficient, hence
minimizing the use of natural resources required by agriculture. In this study
we provide a country-level assessment of the future international trade for 6
primary crops and 3 animal products composing 70% of the human diet caloric
content. We set up four variegate socio-economic scenarios with different level
of economic developments, diets habits, population growth dynamics, and levels
of market liberalization. Results show that the demand of agricultural goods
and the correspondent trade flow will increase with respect to current levels by
10-50% and 74-178% by 2050, respectively. The largest increase in the amount
of traded goods is expected under the Economic Optimism scenario that will
see an average trade flow of 2830 kcal/cap/day (i.e., nearly doubling the cur-
rent per-capita flow). Most of the increase will be driven by the trade of crops
for animal feeding, particularly maize will be the most traded crop. The trade
networks architecture in 2050 and 2080 will be very different from the one we
actually know, with a clear shift of the trade pole from the Western toward
the Eastern economies. The dramatic changes of global food-sources and trade
patterns will jeopardize the water resources of new regions while exacerbating
the pressure in those areas that will continue serving food also in the future.
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In spite of this, trade may annually save around 40-60 m3 of water per person,
compared to a situation where countries are self-sufficient.
Keywords: water-food nexus, virtual water trade, water footprint, agriculture,
future scenarios
Introduction
Since 1980, the world agricultural trade has increased in volume by six times,10
with food trade contributing to 80% of the overall flow [1]. In particular, since
2000 agricultural trade has grown more strongly than in the preceding decade
thanks to falling barriers [2] and boosted by lower transportation and transac-
tion costs. At the same time, the agricultural market has become more ”global”:
the food that consumers find in their local stores is increasingly made from a15
large spectrum of international products coming from different locations across
the globe. For instance, wheat produced in Australia and Ukraine is processed
into flour in Indonesia and Turkey, and then exported to make noodles in China,
and bread in Africa. Currently, around one fourth of the food we consume is
traded internationally and a large amount of global population heavily relies on20
the food trade for its welfare [3].
The study of agricultural trade patterns is key to (i) analysing the mutual
inter-dependency between countries, (ii) food security (e.g., access to food) and
national welfare [4], (iii) the understanding of economic indicators pertaining to
national poverty (e.g., per-capita purchasing power), (iv) transportation plan-25
ning, and (v) the investigation of the environmental threats (e.g., euthrophica-
tion [5] and groundwater depletion [6, 7]) induced by the increasingly complex
and ”global” supply chain of agricultural goods [8, 9].
In light of increasing demand for agricultural goods [10, 11], approaching
yield-plateaus in some locations and boosting production practises in other ones30
[12], what role will agricultural trade play in the future? Where will the agri-
cultural trade pole settle in the upcoming decades? Who will lead the future
agricultural market? Addressing these questions is crucially relevant to monitor
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the evolution of the international economic relationships and to investigate the
effects of trade on natural resources. Moreover, the impacts of climate change35
on agricultural production [13], which are expected to bring greater fluctua-
tions in crop yields and local food supplies especially at lower latitudes [14],
may increase the importance of international trade in supplying food in climate
vulnerable locations. Importantly, trade agreements and international policies
play a crucial role to tackle mitigation objectives and boost international coop-40
eration to lessen the environmental pressure (i.e., the Water Footprint [15]) and
impacts (i.e., the Carbon Footprint [16]) on the Earth system, as it has been
recommended by the IPCC’s fifth assessment report.
A number of long-term economic projections have been provided by the
European Commission [17], the International Monetary Fund [18], and The45
World Bank [19]. However, these studies are mostly focused on the market as
a whole and the separation across commodities and services is generally limited
to few sectors and hardly look at single commodities. Similarly, the commercial
partners are rarely represented at the country scale, but mostly aggregated into
groups/regions as [20] pointed out.50
More detailed forecasts of the future agricultural market have shown impor-
tant insights about the impacts of cropland expansion and intensification on
the agricultural market [21], the implications of trading more food for land use
and GHGs emissions [22, 4], and the water resource system [23, 24]. To these
aims, Partial Equilibrium (PE) models (e.g., IMPACT, GLOBIOM, MAgPIE)55
and Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models (e.g., ENVISAGE, MAG-
NET) are the most used economic models applied to the agricultural sector
to analyse trade responses to productivity and consumption changes under a
spectrum of climatic and socio-economic scenarios [25]. However, PEs’ and
CGEs’ estimations are poorly tested against historical data [26] and they are60
sensible to parameter-choices, resulting in very different outcomes for different
parametrizations, as shown by [25]. Moreover, these models (e.g., IMPACT) do
not allow a region to be both an exporter and an importer of the same commod-
ity [27]. In many cases the models are available only at the regional scale (e.g.,
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MAgPIE) and in some models (e.g., MIRAGE) the trade network architecture65
cannot change in the future: i.e., two partners cannot start trading in the future
if they were not trading in the past [28].
We advance the present state of agricultural trade modelling by providing
and validating an integrated methodology to forecast future agricultural domes-
tic demand, production, and international trade considering time horizons 2020,70
2050, and 2080. We focus our analyses on 6 key global crops and 3 animal prod-
ucts, composing 70% of the human diet measured in terms of caloric content
[3]. We project domestic crop- and animal- demand at the country scale as a
function of population dynamics [29] and diet habits [30] based on the income
growth and environmental paths defined by the Shared Socio-economic Path-75
ways (SSPs) narratives [31]. We disentangle demand into human food, feed for
livestock, and other uses (e.g., seeds, inputs to manufacture), which are seldom
disaggregated in the literature. Crop production is forecast as a function of the
yield scenarios available from [32]. This study presents and validates a new trade
model with country-level and commodity-specific details. This model includes a80
dynamic network structure where commercial partnerships can change over time
depending on demand, supply, and market liberalization. Moreover, the model
takes into account that a country can be at the same time both importer and
exporter of a certain commodity (e.g., wheat), and that the commodity-specific
trade networks are indirectly connected (e.g., the livestock trade network is con-85
nected to the maize trade network through feed demand). Finally, the model
respects the balance constraint of production plus import equal to consumption
plus export for each commodity at the country level, which is not guaranteed,
e.g., by the gravity model [33].
1. Methods90
In this Section, we provide information about the data and methods used to
forecast the future agricultural demand, supply, and international trade flows by
2020-2050-2080. Four assorted scenarios are set-up for 34 plant-based products
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(6 primary crops and 28 derived crops) and 3 animal-based products (Table S1).
Products have been selected on the basis of their importance in human nutrition,95
international trade, and because of their pressure on natural resources.
1.1. Scenarios set-up
Scenarios are used to delineate future long-term narratives of human activ-
ities considering environmental, economic, and social aspects. In this study, we
build on (i) the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) developed in the100
4th IPCC Assessment Report [34] to project future crop production based on
crop yield scenarios provided by the GAEZ database [35] and (ii) the Shared
Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) to project future crop demand as a function of
population scenarios [31] and diet transitions [30]. The comparisons and rec-
onciliation between the SRES and SSP scenarios has been proposed during the105
SSP development phase [36, 37], while the study by [38] found specific corre-
spondences between the SRES scenarios families and the SSPs.
We frame our projections within four scenarios (Table 1), where each is identified
through an archetype that has been derived from [38]. The Economic Optimism
scenario (EO) is driven by the economic success of countries, which prompts a110
globalization of the western diet patterns (”Western high meat” scenario) with
increased shares of animal products in the diets for developing countries and
constant or decreased meat consumption in developed countries. In this sce-
nario, protein consumption will reach 90 grams/cap/day on global average (all
regions above 80 grams/cap/day). We associate this scenario with a liberal-115
ized market and the SSP5 population growth dynamics [29]. In the Regional
Competition scenario (RC), the trade openness is restricted and subordinated
to the national food security due to a faster population growth (SSP3), while
the diet composition remains equal to the current one (”Current meat” scenario
for year 2016). The Sustainable Development scenario (SD) projects a global120
shifting toward a more sustainable pathway (SSP1), accompanied by decreas-
ing population from the middle of the century and diet shifts toward a lower
meat diet (”Less meat” scenario, 70 grams/cap/day of protein) especially across
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Western economies, but with high degree of globalization as in EO. Finally, the
Baseline (BL) scenario is coupled with the SSP2, and the market openness and125
diet composition are kept constant to the 2016 values.
Table 1: Scenarios set-up. Four scenarios are adopted in this study: the
Economic Optimism (EO), the Regional Competition (RC), the Sustainable
Development (SD), and the Baseline (BL) scenario. Each scenario is iden-
tified by three main key features pertaining to the diet composition (west-
ern high meat, WHM, less meat, LM, current meat, CM), the market
openness (restricted, current, liberalized), and the population growth (slow,
medium, fast). Each archetype defined in this study is meant to repro-
duce one of the SSP narrative [39] following the indications provided in [38].
1.2. Scenarios of future agricultural demand
The agricultural domestic demand, Dp,c [ton], of product p in country c ac-
counts for different uses: food for human consumption, feed for livestock, seeds,
inputs to manufacture for food and non-food uses, and losses during storage130
and transportation. To obtain scenarios of future agricultural demand, first we
project the per-capita domestic demand, dp,c, and then we couple this projec-
tion with the future population scenarios, PPc, derived from the SSPs’ scenarios
[29], namely Dp,c = dp,c · PPc. Hereafter, we denote the per-capita variables
with lower-case characters and national scale variables in capital letters.135
First, we quantify the per-capita demand in 2016, using a 17-years (2000-
2016) linear regression of the annual dp,c values. This allows us to obtain more
robust results, given that the past annual dp,c values are affected by stocks’
variations, which cannot be isolated due to high intrinsic uncertainties [40].
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The annual dp,c values are obtained with a top-down approach using production,140
trade data, and population available from the [41], namely
dp,c =
Pp,c + Ip,c − Ep,c
PPc
[ ton
cap
]
(1)
where, Pp,c is the national production of p, Ip,c is the country import, and
Ep,c is the country export. In equation (1), import and export account for both
the primary crops (e.g., barley) and their derived products (e.g., barley pearled,
malt, and beer of barley, see Table S1).145
In order to project the future demand for the ”western high meat” and ”less
meat” diets, we split d2016p,c into per-capita food demand (fo
2016
p,c = l
2016
food · d2016p,c ),
per-capita feed demand (fe2016p,c = l
2016
feed·d2016p,c ), and per-capita demand for ”other
uses” (otp,c = l
2016
others ·d2016p,c ). These components are disentangled at the country
scale according to the fraction of domestic demand used by each sector, l2016,150
obtained with the FAOSTAT data available in the ”Food Balance Sheets”.
Food demand by 2050, fo2050p,c , is obtained by modifying the fo
2016
p,c value
according to the percentage variations shown in Tables 5 and 6 in the SI material,
which have been calculated on the basis of the diet scenarios provided by [30] for
2050. Due to lack of data, we assign the fo2016p,c value to the 2020 projection and155
the fo2050p,c projection to the fo
2080
p,c . The fe
2016
p,c value depends on the domestic
and foreign demand for meat products. Given that the same crop can be fed to
different animals, first we disentangle the crop-specific feed demand across the
considered three animal products, namely
fe2016c,cr,m =
Pr2016c,m ·Km∑
m Pr
2016
c,m ·Km
· fe2016c,cr
[ ton
cap
]
, (2)
where Km indicates the caloric content of the animal product m, namely160
calories per tonne. Then, we project the crop-based feed demand by mod-
ifying the fe2016c,cr,m value according to the rate of variation of m production
(rate2050,2080c,m ) with respect to 2016.
fe2050,2080c,cr,m = fe
2016
c,cr,m · (1 + rate2050,2080c,m )
[ ton
cap
]
. (3)
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Overall, it is worth noting that our approach attributes the (animal-specific)
feed variation only to changes of meat production, while we assume constant feed165
mixes, production technology and management. We recognize the importance of
these aspects causing a different impact on the environment [42], but to date this
is the best approach due to lack of detailed projections about livestock systems.
Finally, we evaluate scenarios for the ”other uses” sector as a function of the
food and feed scenarios and we assume that the ratio of other uses with respect170
to the total domestic demand remains constant in the future. In particular,
we compute l2016others as the complement to 1 of the food and feed proportions,
which have been previously obtained from the ”Food Balance Sheet” data. With
this assumption we can estimate the total per-capita domestic demand of each
product, i.e.175
d2050,2080c,p =
fo2050,2080c,p + fe
2050,2080
c,p
1 − l2016others
, (4)
and, indeed, the demand for ”other uses”, as
ot2050,2080c,p = l
2016
others · d2050,2080c,p . (5)
1.3. Scenarios of future agricultural production
To model the future agricultural supply, we derive the yield scenarios from
the GAEZ database [35] under four different SRES scenarios (A1-F1 for the
Economic Optimism, A2 for the Regional Competition, B1 for the Sustainable180
Development, B2 for the Baseline). Each scenario accounts for land-resource
availability, crop suitability, farm-level management, and crop production po-
tentials that are a function of climate, technology, economic productivity, and
other factors [32]. Accordingly, each scenario comes with 3 different implemen-
tation levels (”low input level” (LIL), ”intermediate input level” (IIL), and ”high185
input level” (HIL)) discriminating the technological advances of each country,
considering how much agriculture is market-oriented, and accounting for the use
of inputs and pesticides. To discriminate the best implementation level for each
time-horizon, we firstly find the best input level for 2020 by comparing country
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yield data of year 2016 (taken from [41]) with the projected yield in 2020 and190
assigning to 2020 the implementation level minimizing the difference. We then
assume one-step increase in the implementation level for each following time
horizon (i.e., 2050-2080). If a country already shows the highest implementa-
tion level, we keep it constant in the future.
As a first assumption, we keep the 2016 cultivated area constant in the future195
and we evaluate the relative attainable production only considering yield sce-
narios. Then we adjust the 2016 cultivated area of those crops showing a global
production smaller/larger than the global demand. Indeed, at the global level
we assume that production meets demand, as in [43, 44]). The crop-specific
coefficient is defined as the ratio between global demand and global production200
of each crop and it is applied uniformly across countries.
Future scenarios of meat production are obtained as a function of the pro-
jected meat demand (Section 1.2). The global meat demand is distributed across
producing countries according to their average production share over 2000-2016.
For instance, on the basis of past data [41], we attribute to China 45% of the205
global pig meat production and to the US 20% of the global cattle meat pro-
duction. We acknowledge that in the future the national production shares may
change, especially under the Economic Optimism scenario due to the intense
meat transition. However, other choices seem to be arbirtary.
1.4. Scenarios of future agricultural trade: a country-level and commodity-based210
approach
National demand for import and national opportunity for export are evalu-
ated as a function of (i) the mismatch between demand (Section 1.2) and supply
(Section 1.3) and (ii) the commodity-specific globalization degree expressing the
market openness typical of each country (Table 1). The national import and215
export flows are then distributed over bilateral trade relations by means of the
RAS algorithm ([45, 46] also called bi-proportional matrix balancing) in order
to chart out the future evolution of the agricultural trade network.
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1.4.1. National import and export
National imports and exports are estimated for each country considering one220
commodity at a time. This is very important, although rarely accomplished in
the current literature [47], because each product has its own trade network, with
specific topology and flow intensities.
In order to explore different levels of market integration, we define three levels
of market openness (fglobc,p ): (i) restricted, (ii) current, and (iii) liberalized. The225
restricted market assumes that each country focuses its economy primarily on
its own needs as if it had some trade barriers that allow trade only in one
direction: outflows of surpluses or inflows of lacking commodities. Hence, the
market openness is zero. The current level of openness assumes that the future
market will maintain a level of globalization equal to nowadays, with similar230
transportation margins, tariffs, and subsidies. Finally, the liberalized market
mimics a world where trade barriers are reduced and countries tend to export
more for economic reasons, rather than just to clear out surpluses.
We define the market openness in year 2016 as the portion of production that
is traded to meet the market demand, regardless the availability of production235
surplus, i.e.
fglobc,p =
Ec,p(Pc,p < Dc,p) + Ic,p(Pc,p > Dc,p)
Pc,p
, (6)
where, the term Ec,p(Pc,p < Dc,p) represents the amount of commodity
that country c exports although its production is not sufficient to satisfy the
domestic demand, while the term Ic,p(Pc,p > Dc,p) quantifies the amount of
product that is imported, despite production surplus, and re-exported. The240
denominator quantifies the total national production of p. We evaluate the
fglobc,p for each commodity and country using the trade and production data of
year 2016 available from [41].
National export is evaluated as the sum of the portion of production that
is exported to meet the demand of the globalized market and the portion of245
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production that exceeds the domestic demand and needs to be disposed, i.e.
Ec,p = f
glob
c,p · Pc,p + max[0, (1 − fglobc,p ) · Pc,p −Dc,p]
[
ton
]
. (7)
National import is obtained by solving the national balance among demand,
supply, and export,i.e.
Ic,p = Dc,p − Pc,p + Ec,p, (8)
where, Dc,p is the national domestic demand projected as described in Section
1.2 and Pc,p is the national supply projected according to Section 1.3. In equa-
tion (8), we do not account for national stocks because we are projecting average
future trade scenarios.
By substituting equation (7) in equation (8), the national import reads
Ic,p = max[0, Dc,p − (1 − fglobc,p ) · Pc,p]. (9)
According to equation (9), a country imports the amount required to match
the domestic demand Dc,p, previously diminished by the portion of production
(1 − fglobc,p ) that is used to satisfy the global market demand.
We notice that while trade projections come separated for each commodity,250
commodities are inherently connected to one another through demand and sup-
ply. For instance, a country increasing its meat production will increase the
demand of crops for feeding; this translates into an increase of crops import
when domestic supply is not sufficient. With the proposed approach we are
able to consider this inter-connection.255
1.4.2. Network topology reconstruction at the country and regional scale
The national import and export projected in Section 1.4.1 are used to re-
construct the network topology, namely the adjacency matrix, A, expressing
the existence of a relation between any couple of countries. We define an ad-
jacency matrix for each commodity trade network, scenario and time horizon.260
Accordingly, ai,j = 1 if the two countries trade the commodity, ai,j = 0 other-
wise. The matrix’s rows represent the export flows, while the matrix’s columns
11
represent the import flows: we assign 1 to all the elements of the matrix that
are found at the cross of a non-zero column sum (Ic,p > 0) and a non-zero row
sum (Ec,p > 0).265
The adjacency matrix represents the unweighted network of each future trade
scenario. We adopt the RAS algorithm [45, 46] to obtain the bilateral trade
flows of each commodity. The RAS algorithm is a balancing method widely
adopted in the context of input-output tables [48], which allows one to esti-
mate the trade flow departing from country c1 and reaching country c2 using270
as input variables the national imports and exports (namely, the columns’ and
rows’ sums). In practice, the initial adjacency matrix is progressively modified
through an iterative procedure of bi-proportional adjustment that distributes
the row and column sums over each matrix element. In order to obtain more
precise estimates of the bilateral flows, we previously adjusted A with the in-275
verse of the geographical distance between the couples of countries. Hence, the
initial bilateral trade flow, fi,j , reads
fi,j =
1
di,j
· ai,j
[
ton
]
. (10)
The initial bilateral trade matrix, F, is then adjusted with two coefficients,
a row factor (ri) and a column factor (sj), which are obtained with an itera-
tive procedure that progressively updates the initial matrix to obtain the final
bilateral trade matrix, F’, that satisfies the equations∑
i
f ′i,j = Ei and
∑
j
f ′i,j = Ij . (11)
The iterative procedure alternatively evaluates the row and the column fac-
tors as follow. At step n=1, sj=1 while ri is calculated to satisfy the row
constraint, namely280
rni =
Ei∑
i fi,j
. (12)
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At step n=2, ri = r
n−1
i and sj is equal to
snj =
Ij∑
j r
n−1
i · fi,j
. (13)
Once the full iteration is completed, it is possible to determine the final row
(Ri) and column (Sj) coefficients, namely
Ri =
∏
n
rni and Sj =
∏
n
snj (14)
Hence, the generic bilateral trade flow reads
f ′i,j = Ri · fi,j · Sj . (15)
The bilateral trade flows projected at the national scale are finally aggregated
at the regional level in order to provide a more robust picture of the future trade285
network. Aggregations are made in order to get estimates of the import and
export flows of each region. We also aggregate the flows moving within the
same region in order to compare intra- and inter-regional flows. We consider
nine different regions (Table 7 in the SI material): Northern America (NAm),
Latin America and Caribbean (LAC), Europe (E), Middle East and Northern290
Africa (MENA), Africa (Af), Eastern Europe and Central Asia (EECA), South
Asia (SA), east Asia and Pacific Islands (EAP), Oceania (O).
1.5. Trade model validation
The trade model proposed in this Section is validated with past trade data
available from [41] over the period 1986-2016. Validation is provided both at295
country and regional scale for each study products. Details about validation
can be found in Section 3 of the SI material. Figures 1,2 in the SI provide the
performances of the trade model through network sketches (i.e., rice and maize
network in 2016) and by means of scatter plots between real and predicted val-
ues. At the country scale, we find an average coefficient of determination (R2)300
of 0.60, while at the regional scale R2 is always larger than 0.80. These out-
comes hold true over the entire period 1986-2016 and confirm a good agreement
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between predicted and real trade flows data. Moreover, the RAS algorithm
(Section 1.3.3) used to estimate bilateral trade flows does not requires a-priori
calibration of the model parameters, but it only needs gross national exports305
and imports, and the network topology. Overall at an aggregated scale, our
trade scenarios are in line with those elaborated by [4, 49, 50, 51].
2. Results
The model’s outcomes are commodity-specific projections of demand, supply,
and trade in metric tonne. For the sake of clarity, we show results aggregated310
over commodities by means of food calories equivalent and virtual water content
[52], despite other measures (e.g., proteins, dollars, CO2) can be similarly used.
All the variations shown are referred to year 2016, unless otherwise specified.
Commodity-specific and country-level results can be found in the SI material.
2.1. Future scenarios of global agricultural demand315
As a global trend, future demand of agricultural products, expressed as
food calorie equivalent, will increase between 10% (SD scenario) and 50% (EO
scenario) by 2050 (see Figure 1A), while it will slow down after 2050, mostly
following decreasing population (Figure 1B). In the Economic Optimism sce-
nario, demand will increase due to a global transition toward meat-intensive320
diets (+43% meat consumption at the global scale, Figure 1C). This will in-
crease by 90% the demand of crops for livestock, which will further enlarge the
amount of human-edible calories that do not directly end-up in the food system
[53]. The largest increases in meat consumption are projected to happen in
Sub-Saharan Africa (+400%), as also shown by [54], due to the increase of both325
per-capita consumption (+200%, Table 5), thanks to larger per-capita income
[55], and population (+130%, SSP5). The per-capita consumption of meat will
increase also in South Asia and in Middle East and Northern Africa, but at
slower rates. However, in these regions total meat consumption will increase
only by 150% due to a slower population growth. As an opposite trend, North330
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America, Europe, and Oceania show a stagnant or decreasing trend of the per-
capita consumption of cattle and pig meat in accordance with past years [41],
despite a persisting increase of meat consumption in North America due to a
50% population growth (EO scenario). Under the Sustainable Development sce-
nario meat consumption will reduce by 18% worldwide, hence requiring half the335
feed required under the EO scenario. Indeed, under the SD scenario more plant-
based products will directly serve as food (Figure 1C). The largest reduction of
meat consumption will happen across the Western economies and in the Eastern
Asian region, which will potentially follow a Green Road aiming at reducing the
impacts on natural resources. However, this will not diminish the feed demand340
of Europe and North America due to their important role as meat producers
and exporters in the global market.
The divergence between EO and SD scenarios increases when we look at the
daily per-capita values of production (or demand): 4500 kcal/day/cap (by 2050)
produced in the EO scenario versus 3000 kcal/day/cap produced in the SD sce-345
nario. This gives a coarse insight of the future per-capita demand of arable
land and water resources. Such difference broadly represents the daily amount
of human-edible calories that we may save with a transition toward less meat-
intensive diets. Saving this amount of calories has profound implications for the
environment, because it would reduce the amount of water and land used, the350
quantity of GHG emissions, and the loss of biodiversity. It is worth noticing
that these per-capita production (demand) values are different from the usual
recommended calories intake because they refer to the gross demand of food,
feed, and other uses. Interestingly, under the Regional Competition scenario
agriculture will need to feed 50% more people than under the EO scenario, but355
the demand will be 20% lower than that of the EO scenario (Figure 1A). Indeed,
in RC scenario meat consumption will increase only by 11%, which will cause
a 12% increase of crops for livestock. Finally, global demand in the Baseline
scenario will vary similarly to that projected in the RC scenario, but it will
remain stable after 2050 due to population slow down.360
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2.2. Future scenarios of global agricultural trade
According to our projections, the international agricultural trade will keep
increasing in the upcoming decades, but at different rates depending on the
national market openness (Table 1) and on the national production surplus (see
Figures S5-S13 for country-level details). Figure 1A shows the modelled past365
agricultural trade (i.e., red dashed line) along 1986-2016 (Section 1 in the SI)
which exhibits a very good accordance with the real data (i.e., black line), and
the future projections. In the EO scenario, trade will increase by 178% by
2050 with respect to current levels (Figure 1A); the most traded crop will be
maize, mostly due to the increased feed demand for meat production. Also the370
trade of barley and soybean will significantly increase under the EO scenario to
sustain the livestock market. In the other scenarios, trade will increase slower,
between 74% (RC scenario) and 83% (SD scenario) by 2050 with respect to year
2016. Interestingly, trade forecasts for the RC scenario are always below those
from the other scenarios, except when approaching year 2080. Indeed, in the RC375
scenario the assumption of a restricted market (Table 1) will imply for countries
to primarily satisfy their domestic demand and to start exporting only surplus
production. Under the RC scenario, wheat will be the most traded crop to fulfil
displaced food demands. Rice and wheat demand will be almost the same by
2050 (2·1015kcal), but rice will be traded three times less than wheat. In the380
EO and SD scenarios, agricultural trade will acquire much importance compared
to production: i.e., nearly 50% of the production will be traded in the global
market by 2050, with consequent issues for the transportation management and
routes planning, trade agreements, and externalization of the impacts arisen by
faraway consumption patterns. Conversely, in the RC and RE scenarios the385
trade magnitude will remain stable around 35% of that of production, hence
similar to current levels.
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2.3. Future geography of agricultural trade: dynamics and implications at the
regional scale
All the considered scenarios agree in showing an increase of the trade flow390
intensity, even if at different rates (Figure 1A). The Economic Optimism sce-
nario shows the largest increase with international trade reaching 7·1015kcal,
i.e., 2850 kcal/cap/day, in 2050, while the other scenarios predict a future flow
around 4-5·1015kcal, i.e., 1240-1640 kcal/cap/day. In the following we aggregate
the country scale scenarios of future trade at the regional scale (see Table 7 in395
the SI) to focus on the key spatial heterogeneity and fragmentation of the future
agricultural market.
2.3.1. Eastern economies
Goods produced in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (EECA, Figure
3A) will dominate the future agricultural market (export share of 30% in all400
scenarios by 2050) mostly at the expense of North America and Latin America
and Caribbean, whose exports will significantly reduce (Figure 2). By 2050 the
largest flows will be directed toward Europe (wheat and soybean mostly, Figure
S4A), Middle East and Northern Africa (wheat and barley mostly), and Eastern
Asia and Pacific Islands (wheat and soybean mostly). This will happen thanks405
to a surplus of crop production (Figures S5-S11) that will be attainable through
yield boosting that could be achieved through technological investments. At
the same time, population growth in this region will slow down, hence limiting
the domestic demand for agricultural goods. Indeed, EECA will become a net
exporter of food equivalent calories under all scenarios (Figure S14) and in 2080410
it will be the least populated region, except under the Regional Competition
scenario. Interestingly, while under the BL scenario EECA will export predom-
inantly wheat, under the EO scenario (Figure S4B) EECA will export a great
amount of soybean, especially toward Europe.
Together with EECA, also the Eastern Asia and Pacific Islands (EAP, Fig-415
ure 3A) will become important exporters of calories (15% export share in 2050,
Figure 2), with flows mostly originating from China, as found by [51], whose pro-
17
duction of wheat and maize, and also of pig meat, chicken meat, and cattle meat
will exceed the national demand (Figures S6, S9, S11-S13). Specifically, under
the Baseline scenario the largest flows will be directed toward North America420
(Figure 3B), particularly in the form of maize and South Asia and Africa in the
form of rice (Figure S4A). Despite increasing its export, EAP will remain an
important importer of soybean from Latin America and Caribbean (LAC),
wheat from EECA, and rice from South Asia. Only in 2080 it will be a net
exporter in all scenarios (Figure S14).425
Overall, all scenarios agree in forecasting a translation of the trade pole toward
the Eastern economies, at the expense of the Atlantic pole.
2.3.2. Western economies
According to our scenarios, Europe will predominantly import from the
EECA, while North America from Latin America and Eastern Asia (Figure 3).430
Europe will be also in the future e net importer of calories (Figure 20 in the
SI) under all scenarios. Under the Baseline scenario it will probably reduce its
export toward the MENA region that will import more calories from EECA.
Under the EO scenario, North America will exhibit the largest degree of
dependency from foreign commodities (Figure S14) due to population growth435
(+50% in 2050 with respect to 2016) and lower land productivity especially for
maize, wheat, and soybean possibly due to climate change [56]. Under three out
of four scenarios, North America will reduce its export share from 30% in 2016 to
7-12% in 2050, as previously suggested by [51]; only in the Regional Competition
scenario it will remain a key exporter in the global market (15% export share,440
Figure S15H), thanks to the lower demand which still guarantees production
surplus. This framework will call for significant adaptation and technological
advances for North America to merely maintain its current productivity [56].
However, while diminishing the export of crops, North America will continue to
export large amounts of chicken meat (mostly coming from the United States)445
toward Africa and the Middle East and Northern Africa region and pig meat
(mostly coming from Canada) toward EAP and LAC. Such exports will further
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rise the domestic demand for plant-based feed.
2.3.3. Southern economies
Under three out of four scenarios, Africa will increase the imports of calories450
from other regions due to the lack of self-sufficiency in the domestic production
of most commodities. However, under the Economic Optimism scenario there
will be only a slight increase of import, while the export will importantly increase
(Figure 2) thanks to the production enhancement attainable through economic
investments and to the more liberalized market (Table 1) that will allow this455
region to increase its role in the global market. In the EO scenario (Figure
S15 panels F,G), the export flows from Africa will reach 7·1014kcal by 2050
and most of them will be directed toward North America in the form of maize.
Indeed, rainfed maize in Africa currently has the greatest yield potential and
the largest yield gap [54]. Hence, especially under the EO scenario Africa may460
close the maize yield gap in many countries (Figure S6A, e.g., Kenya, Tanzania,
Mozambique, Zimbabwe, South Africa) by enhancing the inputs to soil and the
mechanization level and expanding areas under irrigation. Indeed, in the EO
scenario Africa may exceptionally reach the export share of Europe (Figure 2).
Particularly, it seems likely that South Africa will increase its export of all the465
analysed commodities with the exception of rice and sorghum (Figures S5-S13),
as found by [50]. As shown by [54], the path to self-sufficiency will require yield
gap closure, increasing cropping intensity and expansion of irrigated production
through adequate policies that ensure intensification without within the envi-
ronmental limits.470
The overall picture seems to pose EAP and EECA at the guide of the future
trade network. The progressive transition of the trade center from the West to
the East will determine a new configuration of the network. The intensification
of the Oriental pole will be possible through a great increase of crop and meat475
production (also found by [20]), which will allow these regions to have surplus
production, and become net exporters toward most regions, notwithstanding the
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increasing population. Overall, some regions, which used to exchange almost
the same amount of calories in the past (e.g., Figure 24 in the SI, EAP to
Af or EAP to E), will become net exporters toward the regions they used to480
have a balanced relation with. In other cases, the largest preferential flow will
maintain the same direction (e.g., Figure 26 in the SI, LAC to MENA) or will
be reversed (e.g., Figure 28 in the SI, NAm to LAC). The ”Easternization” of
the agricultural market has been also predicted in other studies, either specific
on agricultural trade [4, 49] or pertaining to the gross trade dynamics [57, 58].485
In the following, we will show how the Easternization of the global market
will imply an Easternization of the impacts on water resources induced by the
agricultural practises for the export.
2.4. The role of trade globalization on water resources
International agricultural trade shapes distant inter-dependencies among490
countries, not only in economic terms, but also under environmental perspec-
tives. Recent studies have shown how agricultural trade drives an outsourcing
of environmental impacts pertaining to biodiversity losses [8, 9], depletion and
pollution of freshwater resources [6, 59], eutrophication of river bodies [5], and
tropical deforestation [49]. However, trade can also encourage production where495
it is most efficient, hence minimizing the use of natural resources required by
agriculture [60]. It has been shown that food trade help saving water on a global
scale and that savings have increased since the Eighties thanks to production
shifts in regions where less water is required per unit product [61, 59]. While
the role of other environmental issues, such as land use change and GHGs emis-500
sions, has been analysed by recent studies (e.g., [4]), the impacts of the future
trade network on water resources has been poorly investigated.
In this Section, we show how the future agricultural market will shape a
regional inter-dependencies over water resources under the Regional Competi-
tion scenario -where trade will increase only favoured by the export of surplus505
production- and under the Economic Optimism scenario -where the mutual ef-
fect of production surplus and market liberalization will increase trade flow.
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We measure the market-induced impact on water resources by means of the
Virtual Water indicator [52], which is widely used in the literature to quantify
the water hidden behind each commercial flow that leaves the country where510
water has been used during the production process and reaches the country-
of-consumption [62]. Accordingly, we transform the projected trade flows into
virtual water flows (see [63]) and we infer how much water will be used to sus-
tain the agricultural trade by 2050. In doing this transformation we account for
the fact that the water amount used to produce each product will change in the515
future according to the crop yield: namely, the larger is the yield, the smaller
is the unit water use [63]. We find that, as a consequence of the increased
market liberalization (i.e., EO), by 2050 countries will enlarge their impact on
foreign water resources with respect to current levels by three times. Indeed,
the virtual water trade will reach 2200 km3/year by 2050 (260 m3/cap/yr on520
average), meaning that a giant volume of water will be locally exploited to sus-
tain the global demand. In particular, around 120 km3/year will be displaced
from surface and ground water bodies (i.e., blue water) due to irrigation, hence
increasing the probability of water stress. The largest virtual water exporters
will be Latin America and Caribbean and Eastern Europe and Central Asia,525
while North America and Africa will increasingly rely on foreign water resources
despite Africa increasing its export share of virtual water by 7% (Figure 4B).
Under the Regional Competition scenario (Figure 4C), countries will enlarge
their impact on external water resources (around 1500 km3/year of virtual water,
150 m3/cap/yr), but to a lower extent than under the EO scenario. North530
America will be a key exporter of virtual water, especially toward Africa and
Latin America. Europe will diminish its reliance on foreign water resources
and will keep its export share as small as 10%, while South Asia will increase
its water-dependence from Eastern Europe and Central Asia and Eastern Asia.
The EAP region will have an important role in shaping the future water-based535
inter-dependency both as an exporter and as an importer. However, its export
share of virtual water (13% in EO and 17% in RC, Figure 4C) will be lower
than its real export share of commodities (17% in EO and 20% in RC, Figures
21
21 F,H in the SI). Differently, North America will have a larger export share in
terms of virtual water than of traded commodities. Indeed, North America will540
export a significant amount of animal-based products, which are much more
water-intensive than other products.
Overall, both scenarios point out an important increase in the heterogeneity
of the cross-regional water dependency, which unavoidably challenges the re-
silience and vulnerability of the whole system. Despite a general increase of the545
traded water (+120% under the EO and +45% under the RC with respect to
year 2016), we find that trade enhances efficiencies that in turn are fundamen-
tal for sustainability. Indeed, in all scenarios trade may generate water savings
around 350-570 km3/yr (40-60 m3/cap/yr), which otherwise would be required
if countries domestically produced what they consume. Trade generates global550
water saving when the commercial relation is directed from a more efficient (i.e.,
less water use per unit product) to a less efficient country. This provides a first
insight about the possible water savings generated by international trade; how-
ever, further analyses should be done to account for local water availability, and
thus for possible water stress, land expansion and land-use change.555
Finally, the total water use for agricultural production will remain similar
to that of year 2016 under the EO scenario, while it will decrease by 15-20%
under the other scenarios. Indeed, under the EO scenario cultivated lands will
call for both yield-based intensification and land expansion to meet the global
demand of crops. The combined effects of intensification, which decreases the560
water used per tonne of crop produced, and expansion, which requires additional
water, will result in a water consumption similar to the 2016 levels. Conversely,
under the other scenarios future demand could be met by the only effect of
land intensification, coupled sometimes with land reduction (e.g., for sorghum,
barley, and wheat), hence fostering water savings in producing countries.565
22
3. Limitations and uncertainties
This study provides estimates of future demand, supply, and bilateral trade
flows under variegate scenarios for 6 key primary crops (together with their
derived products) and 3 key animal products. Our results contribute to the
Agricultural Model Intercomparison and Improvement Project (AgMIP, https:570
//agmip.org) aiming at improving agricultural models to evaluate alternative
climate and policy futures.
The integrated approach used here to estimate future bilateral flows on the
basis of exogenous agricultural demand and supply is inherently associated with
different sources of uncertainties due to input data and modelling assumptions.575
Here we analyse the main sources of uncertainty that can impact our scenar-
ios. The uncertainty associated with future population reflects the uncertainty
about future fertility and mortality rates, and education trends [29]. SSPs pop-
ulation scenarios come out without probabilistic projections; however, we give
a measure of the uncertainty that is usually associated with population sce-580
narios by taking advantage of the probabilistic projections provided by the UN
[64], although their model does not take into account education trends as SSPs’
models do. According to these estimates, world population will reach 9.7 billion
by 2050 with a standard deviation in the range between 0.17 and 0.25 billion
people (nearly 2% of the projected population). The future diet composition585
we adopted in this study is based on the work by Erb et al., which provides a
”western high meat” scenario and a ”less meat” scenario [30]. These scenarios
are constructed under different assumptions pertaining, e.g., to GPD variations,
and are only available at the regional scale for products categories. Hence, some
uncertainty occurs when we associate these scenarios to specific countries be-590
cause this removes the diet heterogeneity within each region. Nevertheless,
our estimate of future demand is in accordance with the previous estimates by
[11, 10, 4]. Uncertainties pertaining to production scenarios rise due to the as-
sumption of constant cultivated areas in the future, namely equal to the 2016
levels. According to our scenarios, in fact, production will increase only driven595
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by yields enhancement. However, when we compare the global supply with the
global demand for each product, we find that for some commodities (e.g., maize
and soybean) yield boosts will not be sufficient to satisfy future demand. Ac-
cordingly, we adjust the national cultivated areas with a global factor in order to
meet the demand. Our conservative assumption of initially constant area cou-600
pled with the uniform adjusting factor may hide new land clearing that some
countries might adopt to satisfy future agricultural demand while limiting, e.g.,
fertilizers use and genetically modified plants. Another source of uncertainty
pertaining to production scenarios is the assumption of constant portion of area
equipped for irrigation with respect to the total area. However, spatially-explicit605
and crop-specific information on future irrigated area scenarios are not available
in the literature.
Providing the above mentioned sources of uncertainty in the demand and
supply, which are inputs to our trade model, we test the robustness of our
results through a sensitivity analysis (see Section 2.6 in the SI) that shows how610
uncertainties in the estimates of country demand and supply propagate and
impact bilateral trade estimates. We find that the commodity-specific error
applied to these input variables do attenuate when we aggregate trade flows
across products. Indeed, the resulting coefficient of variations (CV) are in the
range of 0.03-0.04 for all scenarios, thus much smaller than the CV equal to 0.1615
characteristic of the perturbation we have applied.
4. Conclusion
Agriculture accounts for 70% of the global freshwater use [65], 22% of the
global anthropogenic GHG emissions [66], and 11% of world’s land surface [67].
Increasing demand for agricultural goods [10, 11] driven by population growth620
and diet shifts toward meat-intensive products will add further pressure on nat-
ural resources, with important implications for the whole Earth system. With
food production causing major global environmental risks, the EAT-LANCET
report [68] has stated that sustainable food production should use no additional
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land, safeguard existing biodiversity, reduce consumptive water use and manage625
water responsibly, while limiting GHGs emissions.
In this context we have elaborated and analysed possible future scenarios of
demand, supply, and trade of agricultural goods by 2020, 2050, and 2080 with
the introduction and validation of a new approach. The biggest novelties of our
study rely in the trade model. As an advancement from current literature, we630
have included: (i) commodity-specific and bilateral trade flows prediction at the
country scale, (ii) dynamic structure of the network topology where partnerships
can change in time, (iii) global and country-scale balance constraints between
demand, supply, import, and export, and (iv) identification of those countries
that are at the same time importer and exporter of a particular commodity635
(e.g., wheat).
According to our forecasts, global agricultural demand is expected to in-
crease by 10-50% over the period 2016-2050 and according to two out of four
scenarios nearly half of the demand will be met by the international trade.
Indeed we forecast an increase of the global trade flow with changes between640
74% (i.e., Regional Competition scenario) and 178% (i.e., Economic Optimism
scenario) by 2050 depending on the market openness and national production
surplus. Based on these factors, the future trade network architecture will be
very different from the current one. Indeed, all scenarios agree in showing a
transition of the trade pole from the Western toward the Eastern economies.645
The increase of trade will drive increasingly displaced environmental im-
pacts, which will be caused in many cases by consumption patterns based on
long-range imports. As shown in this study, the role of diet composition and the
shifts toward meat-intensive regime under the Economic Optimism scenario will
have profound implication for water resources: i.e., 2200 km3 of water will be650
virtually traded in a year compared to the 1500 km3 that may be traded under
the Regional Competition scenario. At the same time, under the EO scenario
land cultivated with maize, soybean, and barley may increase by 150% on av-
erage due to larger feed demand, hence going in the direction which is opposite
to that suggested by the LANCET report. Conversely, under the Sustainable655
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Development scenario land can stay constant or even decrease (except for rice)
in time thanks to a decreased meat consumption in the Western economies and
a moderate increase in the Eastern and Southern economies.
Results suggest that a major objective for future negotiations should be to
account for the environmental externalities pertaining to both land use (defor-660
estation), GHGs emissions and water resources depletion and impose the related
costs on the produced goods. More collaboration is needed in order to reduce
situations where countries gain from trade but damaging the environment at
the same time. The study by [4] shows that regions which gain from increased
trade are able to pay a sufficient portion of their benefits to account for related665
environmental damages like deforestation and GHG emissions.
5. Data availability
The data that support the findings of this study are available from the
corresponding author upon request.
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Nomenclature
c country
cr crop880
Dp,c agricultural domestic demand of product p in country c
dp,c per-capita agricultural domestic demand of product p in country c
Ep,c export of product p from country c
fglobc,p country-level and commodity-based level of market openness
fec,cr,m per-capita feed demand of product p in country c going to animal m885
fop,c per-capita food demand of product p in country c
Ip,c import of product p from country c
l2016 fraction of domestic demand going to food, feed, and other uses
m animal product
p product890
Pp,c agricultural production of product p in country c
PPc country population
r row factor for the RAS algorithm
rate2050,2080c,m rate of animal production variation calculated with respect to year
2016895
s column factor for the RAS algorithm
38
A adjacency matrix of the bilateral trade flow
F bilateral trade network
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